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SELF-SELECTION BIAS IN LONGITUDINAL ESTIMATION OF WAGE GAPS 
Gary SOLON * 
The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220, USA 
Cross-sectional regression analyses of wage gaps may be biased by omission of unobserved worker characteristics. Recent 
studies therefore have used longitudinal data to ‘difference out’ the effects of such variables. This paper, however. shows that 
self-selection of job changers may cause longitudinal estimation of wage gaps to be inconsistent. 
1. Introduction 
The empirical literature in labor economics abounds with studies of wage gaps between union and 
non-union workers, workers in safe and dangerous jobs, workers for small and large employers, and 
so forth. Most of these studies have used cross-sectional data on individual workers to estimate 
regressions of the wage (or, more commonly, its natural logarithm) on the variable of main interest 
while attempting the ‘hold other things equal’ by controlling for a vector of other worker and job 
characteristics. Despite these efforts to control for other factors, the possibility remains that 
cross-sectional estimation of wage gaps has been biased by failure to control for unobserved worker 
characteristics related to both the wage and included regressors. This possibility has motivated a 
legion of recent researchers to ‘difference out’ unobserved individual characteristics by estimating 
fixed-effects models with longitudinal data. This longitudinal literature has grown so rapidly that a 
full listing of references would be futile, but notable examples include he studies by Freeman (1984) 
and Mellow (1981) on union-non-union wage differences, Brown (1980) and Duncan and Holmlund 
(1983) on wage premiums for dangerous or unpleasant working conditions, Brown and Medoff 
(1985) on wage differences by employer size, Krueger and Summers (1988) on interindustry wage 
differences, and Madden (1985) on wage differences by length of commuting trip. 
The purpose of this paper is to question whether such longitudinal analyses produce consistent 
estimation of wage gaps. Section 2 motivates the discussion with a graphical exposition of an extreme 
but illustrative case. Section 3 provides a formal analysis of the general problem - that self-selection 
of job changers can cause longitudinal estimation to confound the true wage gap with worker taste 
parameters related to the job changing decision. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the analysis. 
2. An extreme example 
Because the derivation of this paper’s main result in Section 3 is rather technical, it is worthwhile 
first to develop intuition for the result with a simple example. This example, like the analysis 
throughout this paper, focuses on the simplest longitudinal data structure, one where the sampled 
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individuals are observed at two points in time. (Most of the studies cited above used data of this 
type.) With such data, one controls for fixed unobserved worker characteristics simply by ‘first-dif- 
ferencing’ them out, i.e., by estimating a regression of change in the wage measure on change in the 
variable of main interest (as well as changes in the control variables). For example, if the relevant 
wage measure w is the natural logarithm of the wage and d is a dummy variable equal to 1 in 
dangerous jobs and 0 in safe ones, a longitudinal study of compensating wage differences for 
dangerous jobs then would examine the relationship between change in w and change in d, and 
would interpret a positive estimated relationship as evidence of compensating differences. 
The pitfall in this approach is best illustrated by the following vivid, though implausible, example. 
Suppose that, despite a universal preference among workers for safe jobs, the market provides no 
wage premium for dangerous work. This case is illustrated in fig. 1, which measures w on the vertical 
axis and d on the horizontal axis. The bell-shaped curves represent, for workers of a given skill level, 
the distributions of market wage opportunities at each safety level. The wage distributions shown for 
d = 0 and d = 1 are alike, representing the absence of any systematic compensating differences. 
Now consider a worker initially in a safe (d = 0) job. The utility level for this worker - if, for 
example, his log wage happens to be the mean p of the distribution - is represented by the 
indifference curve ’ through the point (EL, 0). Since w is a good and d is a bad, the indifference curve 
is positively sloped. Consequently, this worker will choose to change to a more dangerous job only if 
it offers him a substantial wage increase. 
In contrast, a worker initially at a dangerous (d = 1) job - for example, one whose initial (IV, d) 
pair is (p, 1) - may choose to change to a safer job even if it offers a moderately lower wage. As a 
result, a comparison of job changers is likely to find that those who move from safe to dangerous 
jobs experience larger wage increases on average than do those who move from dangerous to safe 
jobs. The self-selection of job changers produces the positive relationship between observed changes 
in wage and danger even if, as in fig. 1, the market offers no systematic wage premium for dangerous 
work. 
This example, of course, is quite contrived, but the point it highlights is more generally applicable. 
Even where the true wage gap between two job types is non-zero and regardless of whether workers 
prefer one job type to other, self-selection of job changers causes longitudinal estimation of the wage 
gap to be inconsistent. This point is formally demonstrated in the next section, which analyses a 
two-sector model of wage variation and job changing. 
’ The indifference curve is drawn for expository convenience. Of course, with a dichotomous d, only two points on the curve 
are applicable. 
3. A formal model 
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This section presents a model in which workers work for two periods in either of two sectors. The 
sectors are indexed by d = 0 (e.g., for the safe sector, the non-union sector, or the sector with small 
employers) and d = 1 (e.g., for the dangerous sector, the union sector, or the large-employer sector). 
Every worker’s preferences among jobs are represented by the simple utility function U = w - ad 
where w is the log wage and (Y is a taste parameter. In the case where d = 1 denotes a dangerous job, 
workers’ distaste for dangerous work is represented by a positive a. In the case where d = 1 denotes 
unionization or a large employer, the sign of (Y is less clear. 
In his first period in the labor market, each worker randomly draws an initial job with log wage 
w, and sector index d,. The probability that he draws a job with d, = 1 is denoted by p; the 
probability that d, = 0 is 1 -p. If the worker draws a job with d, = 0, w, is drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean p and positive variance a:. As in Jovanovic (1979) the positive variance 
arises from heterogeneity in the productivity of worker-employer matches. 2 If the worker draws a 
job with d, = 1, w, is drawn from a normal distribution with mean p + 6 and positive variance a:. A 
non-zero average wage gap S between sectors could arise either from non-competitive forces (e.g., 
from union bargaining in th,: case of the union-non-union gap) or from competitive forces as is 
usually supposed in models of compensating wage differences). In the latter case, the equilibrium 
value of S would depend not only on the worker taste parameter LX, but also on the extent of match 
heterogeneity in each sector as well as on the determinants of each sector’s labor demand. 3 
In his second period in the labor market, each worker makes a new independent draw of another 
job opportunity (w,, d,) from the same joint distribution as described above. Define Aw = w2 - w,, 
Ad = d, - d,, and a2 = ai + a:. Then 
Ad= 1 with probability ~(1 -p), 
= - 1 with probability p (1 - p) , 
= 0 with probability 1 - 2p(l -p), 
and 
N(S, a’) if Ad= 1, 
Aw-N(-6, a’) if Ad= -1, 
- N(0, 2ai) if Ad= 0 with d, = d, = 0, 
- N(0, 20:) if Ad=0 with d,=d,=l. 
An alternative interpretation of the variances ui and of, due to Roy (1951) is that they reflect heterogeneity among 
workers in productivity by sector. If this interpretation were pursued, each worker would face a different wage gap between 
sectors and, in the remainder of the paper, F would be defined as the population average of those wage gaps. The 
mathematical analysis would be modified only slightly and would end with the same qualitative result that plim 8 5 6 as 
CY$ s. 
In a conventional static compensating differences model with homogeneous worker preferences, the wage gap is supply-de- 
termined by perfectly elastic sectoral labor supply curves at 6 = a. Such a model is useless for interpreting longitudinal 
analyses, however, because it generates no purposeful job changing. As pointed out by Bull and Jovanovic (1988). in models 
which do generate job changing by incorporating imperfect information and match heterogeneity, sectoral labor supply 
curves are positively sloped. Their elasticities depend on the magnitude of match heterogeneity in each sector, and the 
equilibrium wage gap 6 depends also on the positions of the sectoral labor demand curves. 
288 G. Solon / Se+selecrwn bias 
A worker chooses to change to the newly discovered job if it increases his utility, that is, if 
Aw > add. Otherwise, the worker stays in his original job. 4 Consequently, the worker’s observed 
period-to-period change in job characteristics is 
(Aw*, Ad*)=(O,O) if AwsaAd, 
(Aw, Ad) if Aw >aAd. 
Most longitudinal studies of wage gaps attempt to estimate the average gap 6 by least squares 
estimation of the regression of Aw * on Ad *. The probability limit of the resulting estimator 8 is 
plim 8=cov(Aw*, Ad*)/var(Ad*), 
This probability limit can be easily, though tediously, derived on the basis of well-known properties 
of truncated normal distributions. ’ The result, shown below, demonstrates that the self-selection of 
job changers causes 6 to be inconsistent. 
In particular, since 
var(Ad*)=p(l -p){l -p(1 -p)[1 -2@((@-6)/e)]2 
and 
cov(Aw*, Ad*) =S var(Ad*) -p(l -p)[l -2@((a-8)/a)] 
it follows that 
plim 8 = 6 -p(l -p)[l - 2@((E - 6)/e)] 
x (2p(1 -~++((a- We) + fiN0[(1 -~)~ea+~*ei])/var(Ad*). 
Inspection of this expression reveals that 
plim$$u as a$8. 
Thus, the conventional longitudinal estimator of the average wage gap 6 is consistent only in the 
special and unlikely case that S and (Y are precisely equal. 
4 This model assumes unrealistically that all job changing is voluntary. It is true, though, that mosf job changes are voluntary. 
For example, household heads in the 1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics were asked if their present job positions had 
begun since January 1, 1983. If so, they were asked what happened to their previous positions. If one counts employer 
closings and relocations, layoffs and firings, and endings of seasonal or temporary jobs as involuntary changes and quns 
and promotions as voluntary changes, 70% of the reported job changes are voluntary. The corresponding figure for wives of 
household heads is 74%. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of changers indicated that their present jobs were better 
than their previous jobs. See pages 197-198 and 259 of Survey Research Center (1986). 
5 For a step-by-step derivation of the probability limit, see Solon (1986). 
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4. Summary and discussion 
This paper has presented a simple model to illustrate the inconsistency of conventional longitudi- 
nal estimation of wage gaps. The problem is that identification of wage gaps in longitudinal studies 
depends mainly on wage changes of job changers, who are largely a self-selected group. 
One obvious application of the previous section’s analysis is to longitudinal estimation of 
union-non-union wage differences. In fact, the self-selection issue in this context has already been 
discussed by Freeman (1984). Freeman’s discussion, however, pertains to a different estimator of S 
and also implicitly assumes that (Y = 0, i.e., that, given equal wages, workers are indifferent between 
union and non-union jobs. In that case, he finds that longitudinal analysis tends to underestimate the 
true 6. The previous section’s result clearly leads to the same conclusion in that case: if a = 0 and 
S > 0, then S > (Y and hence plim s^ < S. But the present paper’s analysis can be generalized to cases 
of non-zero OL as well. Several writers ’ have proposed reasons other than higher wages (such as 
non-wage benefits and protection against arbitrary management practices) for why workers might 
prefer union jobs. These factors suggest that (Y < 0, which just strengthens the conclusion that S > (Y 
and plim s^ < S. Furthermore, even if (Y > 0 (that is, workers have a distaste for unionized employ- 
ment), as long as (Y is less than 6, the downward inconsistency of d still applies. 
Another application is to the large literature that attempts to test the theory of compensating wage 
differences. Much of this literature focuses on whether wage premiums appear in jobs with high risk 
of injury or death. As Smith (1979) explains, this focus is necessary because the theory generates a 
refutable hypothesis that compensating differences must prevail only in cases of job characteristics 
universally regarded as disagreeable. These studies then maintain the hypothesis that workers prefer 
safe jobs (i.e., cr > 0) and test a null hypothesis that, despite such preferences, no compensating 
differences arise (i.e., S = 0). This null hypothesis corresponds exactly to the example discussed in 
section 2. As claimed there and proved in section 3, if S = 0 and (Y > 0, then (Y > S and plim S > S = 0. 
Thus, longitudinal studies would tend to ‘corroborate’ the theory of compensating differences even if 
it were false. Furthermore, in the more plausible case that the theory has some validity, longitudinal 
estimation of the magnitude of S remains generally inconsistent. 
Finally, lest the results in this paper be used too confidently for determining the signs of 
estimators’ inconsistencies or for devising new estimators, it is worth emphasizing the special nature 
of the analysis. This paper’s model assumes that all job changing is voluntary and is guided by a 
particular arbitrary utility function and job changing rule. Furthermore, the analysis pertains to only 
two periods, and the model of wage dispersion involves arbitrary normality assumptions. The 
analysis is therefore far from definitive; rather, it gives an illustration of how self-selection of job 
changers can distort longitudinal estimation of wage gaps. 
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